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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
NEIL DIXON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of second degree 
robbery (R. 194-195). The charges were tried before a 
jury with the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson presiding 
in the Third District Court for the State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, Neil Dixon, was found guilty by a 
jury (R. 194-195) of the crime of robbery on February 
26, 1974; and was sentenced to the Utah State Prison 
to serve an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years 
as prescribed by law. 
Case No. 
13649 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the judgment of the 
Third District Court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the early morning of December 8, 1973, shortly 
after midnight (R. 60), Jack D. Patterson, a part-time 
clerk at the Seven-Eleven Store located at 4657 West 
5415 South, was robbed of approximately $20. The victim 
described the robber as a black male with a sparce, 
scraggly beard (R. 56-57); a nylon stocking over his face 
(R. 56); and wearing a blue stocking cap (R. 56), green 
field jacket (R. 56), and carrying a pearl handle .22 
caliber revolver (R. 60). The assailant fled on foot behind 
the store (R. 63). 
Patterson immediately phoned the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Office (R. 63) who in turn dispatched law en-
forcement personnel (R. 83-84). In light of the fact that 
few black people reside in the area of the robbery (R. 
86, 88-89, 108), patrol cars were sent to cover all principle 
eastern and northern routes (R. 94). Within minutes 
the appellant, a passenger in a motor vehicle (R. 100), 
was identified by Officer David M. Keiley at a distance 
of 25 feet with the assistance of his automobile lights 
(R. 100) at the intersection of 3500 South and Redwood 
Road (R. 100), as the suspect who committed the rob-
bery. Officer Kelly called for additional police assistance 
and stopped the suspect after determining that the pas-
senger of the vehicle matched the description of the 
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suspect in the armed robbery (R. 100). After stopping 
the automobile the officer noticed that the stocking cap 
(R. 102), pearl handled gun (R. 103, 112), and coat (R. 
104) of the suspect matched the description of the assail-
ant involved in the robbery and the appellant was sub-
sequently arrested (R. 104). A search was made of the 
car in which the appellant was riding after he was placed 
under arrest (R. 112). 
During interrogation, Sergeant Egan indicated that 
the appellant claimed to have been visiting with his sis-
ter-in-law's mother (R. 142) although he was unable to 
articulate the location of such residence (R. 171-172, 
176). When questioned about the robbery the appellant 
stated to Officer Smith that "it won't do me a damned 
bit of good to tell you because you are going to throw 
my goddamned ass in jail anyway" (R. 128). 
A short time after the robbery, the victim positively 
identified the pearl handled revolver at the scene of the 
arrest (R. 72). 
The victim was photographed and booked on the day 
of the robbery (R. 165-66). The appellant admitted 
that the photograph was a reasonable facsimile of the 
way he looked on the night of his arrest (R. 167) and 
that there was nothing misleading with regord to the 
picture that was taken (R. 167). Thereafter, the victim 
was presented with a group of ten photographs on De-
cember 11, 1973, from which he identified the appellant 
as the individual who committed the robbery (R. 59,119). 
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Gary Scott, was the other party who was driving 
the vehicle at the time the appellant was arrested (R. 
161). The appellant admits that he has not seen Mr. 
Scott since shortly after his release from jail in January, 
1973 (R. 162) and that he is uncertain of his address 
(R. 161) although knows that he is in Ogden (R. 162). 
The record indicates that the appellant has made at-
tempts to locate Mr. Scott although there is no state-
ment which would indicate what methods or efforts were 
employed to find hi swhereabout (R. 161, 162). The 
respondent also unsuccessfully subpoenaed Mr. Scott but 
admitted that his means were inadequate as the sub-
poena was merely mailed (R. 186). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
OFFICERS KELLY AND SMITH LAWFUL-
LY STOPPED THE VEHICLE IN WHICH 
APPELLANT WAS RIDING AND SUBSE-
QUENTLY MADE A PROPER ARREST AND 
SEIZURE; AND, THEREFORE, THE EVI-
DENCE OBTAINED THEREBY WAS PROP-
ERLY ADMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
The appellant has attacked the lower court judgment 
on the basis that he was convicted by the use of evidence 
which was obtained by an illegal search of the car in 
which he was riding shortly after the crime was com-
mitted. Appellant supports this argument by stating 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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that there was no probable cause for arrest and further 
cites Gatlin v. United States, 326 F. 2d 266 (D. C. Cir. 
1963), as authority for his position. However, it is obvious 
that the racial and cultural makeup of the District of 
ol Columbia which played an important part in the 
Gatlin case is easily distinguishable from the community 
in which the robbery in question was committed. Addi-
tionally, there is controlling Utah case law on this point 
without resorting to federal districts or circuits outside 
our own. 
Since Officers Kelly and Smith did not observe or 
have reason to believe that the automobile in question 
had been involved in a traffic violation, the appellant 
insists that the officer was required to have "probable 
cause" to believe that the occupants of the automobile 
committed a felony before he could lawfully stop the 
vehicle. We disagree. 
The standard of probable cause is generally asso-
ciated with arrests, and the law draws a distinction be-
tween arresting a person, and merely stopping or detain-
ing him. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-1 (1953), defines 
an arrest as: 
". . . the taking of a person into custody 
in a case and in the manner authorized by 
law. . . . " 
This Court listed what it considers to be the basic ele-
ments of an "arrest" in State v. Beckendorf, 79 Utah 
360, 10 P. 2d 1073 (1932): 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"Notice of arrest should be given, either 
expressly or by implication, and without such 
notice, no amount of physical restraint can con-
stitute an arrest (cite omitted). The act re-
lied upon as constituting an arrest must have 
been performed with the intent to effect an 
arrest and must have been so understood by the 
person sought to be arrested. A forcible seiz-
ure of one's person, without any pretense of 
taking him into legal custody, does not amount 
to an arrest." Id. at 366. 
See also Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-9 (1953). Clearly, 
the mere stopping of a person during the course of a 
polioe officer's investigation does not fulfill the above 
requirements, and amounts to something short of an 
arrest. Stopping a person is not the "taking of a person 
into custody," but rather a means of conducting an in-
vestigation which may lead to a subsequent arrest. At 
the most, a police stop can be considered the first stage 
of a temporary detention of an individual. 
The United States Supreme Court in the case of 
Terry v. State of Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), made it clear 
that probable cause is not required before an officer may 
stop a person suspected of having committed a crime: 
"I t does not follow that because an of-
ficer may lawfully arrest a person only when 
he is apprised of facts sufficient to warrant a 
belief that the person has committed or is com-
mitting a crime, the officer is equally unjusti-
fied, absent that kind of evidence, in making 
any intrusions short of an arrest." Id. at 26. 
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The Court further stated: 
" . . . a police officer may in appropriate 
circumstances and in an appropriate manner 
approach a person for purposes of investigat-
ing possible criminal behavior even though 
there is no probable cause to make an arrest." 
Id. at 22. 
Numerous state court decisions have held that police 
steps and detentions need not be ftninded on probable 
cause. In State v. Clomcm, 254 Or. 1, 456 P. 2d 67 (1969), 
the Oregon Supreme Court held that an officer's stopping 
of an automobile to determine the identity of the occu-
pant and the vehicle was not an arrest, and could be 
made without probable cause. In State v. Gunter, 100 
Ariz. 356, 414 P. 2d 734 (1966), the police had been 
informed that a driver of a certain automobile had dis-
charged a shotgun at a gas station. The police stopped 
the automobile a short time later to investigate, and 
subsequently arrested the defendant. The defendant con-
tested the right of the police to stop this car, and the 
Supreme Court of Arizona held: 
"Circumstances short of probable cause 
to make an arrest may still justify an investiga-
tion. Should the investigation then reveal prob-
able cause to make an arrest, the officer may 
make an arrest and conduct a reasonable search 
incidental thereto." Id. at 738. 
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has 
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consistently held that probable cause is not required to 
stop automobiles. In United States v. Sadler, 458 F. 2d 
906 (10th Cir. 1972), a highway patrolman stopped a 
car for a routine driver's license and registration check. 
As a result of investigation of facts learned as a result 
of the stop, the patrolman found that the vehicle had 
been reported stolen and arrested the occupant of the 
car. The New Mexico patrolman testified that he made 
the initial stop on the basis of the Colorado dealer plates 
which were displayed on the car and the visible damage 
to the trunk lid as though it had been pried open. The 
Court held: 
(1) "Detention for a routine automobile 
registration check is not, per se, illegal," 458 
F.2d at 908, and 
(2) "Additionally, the patrolman's testi-
mony indicated there was some basis for suspi-
cion which would justify stopping the automo-
bile." Id. 
In United States v. Saldana, 453 F. 2d 352 (10th 
Oir. 1972), a case involving the transportation of aliens, 
the defendant was stopped because he had persons of 
"Mexican descent" with him. In United States v. Fallon, 
457 F. 2d 15 (10th Cir. 1971), the defendants were stopped 
because they were "conspicuous." In Welch v. United 
States, 361 F. 2d 244 (10th Ciri 1966), the defendant 
was stopped because he was driving very slowly and 
had his head leaning to one side. In all of the above 
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cases, the Tenth Circuit held that the officers had a 
reasonable basis for stopping the defendant. 
The "reasonableness" standard was discussed in the 
recent United States Supreme Court decision of Adams 
v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972). In that case, an 
officer had received a tip from a reliable informer that 
an individual in a car parked nearby was carrying nar-
cotics and a gun at his waist. The officer approached 
the car to investigate and asked the occupant to open 
the door. The occupant rolled down the car window 
whereupon the officer reached into the car and removed 
a loaded revolver from the suspect's waistband. The 
individual was arrested and the car was searched. The 
defendant challenged the validity of his detention and 
arrest and the admissibility of the evidence seized. After 
reiterating the views previously announced in Terry, the 
Court discussed the "reasonableness" standard for stops 
as follows: 
"A brief stop of a suspicious individual, 
in order to determine his identity or to maintain 
the status quo momentarily while obtaining 
more information, may be most reasonable in 
light of the facts known to the officer at the 
time" (Emphasis added.) 
The Court in Gilbert v. United States, 366 F. 2d 923 
(C. A. Cal. 1966), cert, denied, 388 U. S. 922 (1967), 
stated the reasonableness standards as follows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"There is nothing ipso facto unconstitu-
tional in the brief detention of citizens under 
circumstances not justifying an arrest, for 
purposes of limited inquiry in the course of 
routine police investigations; and . . . the test 
of the validity of such a brief detention is 
whether from the totality of the circumstances 
it appears that the detention was based upon 
reasonable grounds and was not arbitrary or 
harrassing" Id. at 298 (Emphasis added.) 
A series of California decisions have also stressed that 
reasonableness may be established upon a showing that 
the stop and detention are not "arbitrary or harassing." 
See Wade v. United States, 457 F. 2d 335 (C. A. Cal. 
1972); United States v. Zubia-Sanehez, 448 F. 2d 1232 
(C. A. Cal. 1971); and United States v. Brown, 436 F. 
2d 702 (C. A. Cal. 1970). 
The facts clearly indicate that a man (later ideniti-
fied as the appellant) robbed the victim while employed 
by the previously mentioned Seven-Eleven store. The 
victim phoned in a description to the police and within 
minutes, the sheriff's office located the appellant who 
fit the description of the dispatcher broadcast (R. 99-
100). The automobile in which the appellant was riding 
was stopped by law enfrocement personnel and further 
evidence including a stocking cap, revolver and green 
coat was discovered (R. 104). On the basis of these 
observation the sheriff's office placed the appellant 
under arrest and impounded the blue stocking cap 
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(State's Exhibit No. 2), and a green jacket (State's Ex-
hibit No. 3), as evidence. 
The previously mentioned observations clearly indi-
cated that Officer Kelly was justified in stopping the 
vehicle and Officer Smith was justified in arresting the 
appellant. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-3 (1953), empowers a 
peace officer to arrest a person without a warrant as 
follows: 
" . . . (3) When he has reasonable cause 
for believing the person to have committed a 
public offense, although not in his presence, 
and there is reasonable cause for believing that 
such person before a warrant can be obtained 
and served may: (a) . . . conceal himself to 
avoid arrest, or (b) destroy or conceal evi-
dence of the commission of the offense." 
See also State v. Dodge, 12 Utah 2d 293, 365 P. 2d 798 
(1961). 
Moreover, the rule is well-established that upon mak-
ing such a lawful arrest a police officer may seize any 
evidence for which there is a reasonable basis to believe 
is connected with the suspect or under his control and 
would be probative of this or other crime. See Chimel 
v. California, 395 U. S. 752, 89 S .Ot. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 
685 (1969), and Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 234, 
88 S. Ot 992, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1967). 
State v. Torres, 29 Utah 269, 508 P. 2d 534 (1973), 
is a recent Utah State Supreme Court decision who 
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closely parallels the factual situation of the present con-
troversy. The Court rejected appellant's argument that 
the police did not have probable cause to stop, arrest 
and search the appellant as follows: 
"When a serious crime has been commit-
ted, the law-abiding citizenry should be willing 
to put up with a moderate amount of inconven-
ience to cooperate with officers attempting to 
capture suspects. In some situations it is neces-
sary and therefore justifiable to resort to 
measures which otherwise might be considered 
improper intrusions, such as setting up road 
blocks and checking cars or conveyances in the 
area. In such exigencies it is essential that a 
reasonable degree of tolerance be indulged as 
to the judgment of police officers, so long as 
they are acting in good faith and within stand-
ards of decent and decorous behavior." 508 
P.2d at 536. 
After certain crimes are committed, it has become 
established policy for the police to cordon off a given 
area surrounding the scene of the crime and set up road-
blocks to stop all traffic in and out of the area. Such 
police practices have been held reasonable to facilitate 
their investigation of the crime. Similarly, officers pa-
trolling the vicinity of a recently committed crime should 
also be permitted to stop vehicles observed in the area. 
In United States ex reL Farrugian v. Bhono, 256 F. 
Supp. 391 (D. C. N. Y. 1966), the court held the follow-
ing: 
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"Under New York law, an officer who 
had been summoned to the scene of a reported 
crime and saw an automobile parked nearby 
had the clear right to require the occupant be-
hind the wheel to produce his license and regis-
tration." 
Few would doubt an officer's authority to stop a 
person seen walking on a street, late at night, in a di-
rection away from the scene of a crime which had been 
recently reported. However, when such person happens 
to be riding in an automobile, it becomes impossible for 
an investigating officer to speak with them or identify 
them without asserting authority to stop the car. Thus, 
it should not seem unreasonable to permit police to stop 
motor vehicles and inspect driver's licenses as was done 
by Officer Kelly. This merely places the motorist found 
in the vicinity in the same position as the pedestrian. 
The Court in Torres, supra, held that the stopping 
under exigent circumstances did not constitute an un-
reasonable search and seizure as defined in Utah Const., 
Art. I, § 14, and United States Const. Amendment IV. 
The next question is whether Officer Kelly's deci-
sion to stop the vehicle occupied by appellant for in-
vestigative purpose was "reasonable" under the "total-
ity of the circumstances." Respondent submits that it 
was. 
The Court in Torres spelled out the test of reason-
ableness which should be applied on the question as to 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
whether there has been a violation of one's constitutional 
rights as follows: -S 
"[T]hat is, whether fair minded persons, 
knowing the facts, and taking into considera-
tion not only the rights of the individuals in-
volved in the inquiry or search, but also the 
broader interests of the public to be protected 
from crime and criminals, would regard the 
conduct of the officers as being unreasonable." 
508 P . 2d at 536. 
See also Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 
10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1962), and State v. Richards, 26 Utah 
2d 318, 489 P. 2d 442 (1971). 
From the review of the aforementioned facts, re-
spondent submits that the conduct of Officers Kelly and 
Smith was reasonable based on the totality of the cir-
cumstances. 
Respondent further contends that it is in the public 
interest that police officers be informed of criminal ac-
tivity in the community, and it is essential for police 
officers to contact citizens in order to become so in-
formed. Such contact, in the absence of coercion, does 
not constitute a significant infringement on individual 
liberty, and the law-abiding citizen should have a desire, 
if not a duty, to cooperate with the police in protecting 
his community, and should not be annoyed by reason-
able stops made by the police. Respondent therefore 
concludes that Officers Kelly and Smith lawfully stopped 
the vehicle occupied by appellant ,and that after the stop, 
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they obtained sufficient probable cause to arrest appel-
lant and seize the evidence located in the car. Thus, the 
evidence seized was properly admitted by the trial court. 
The final pertinent consideration is that it is pri-
marily the responsibility of the trial court to determine 
the question of reasonableness and to rule upon the ad-
missibility of evidence. Such judicial rulings are pre-
sumed to be correct and should not be disturbed unless 
it clearly appears that there was error. See State v. 
Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P. 2d 517 (1968). 
Applying the above principles to the facts of this 
case, we see nothing which would justify overtiuiiing 
the conviction. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT WAS IN NO WAY PREJU-
DICED AT TRIAL BY THE ADMISSION 
OF HIS PHOTOGRAPH INTO EVIDENCE. 
A brief review of appellant's photograph (State Ex-
hibit No. 8) which was admitted into evidence indicates 
that there was no prejudice nor inflammatory value de-
rived therefrom. Hence, appellant's contention which 
isnot suported by any statutory or case law authority 
appears to be without merit. 
The admission of photographs into evidence is prop-
erly within the sound discretion of the trial court and 
the reviewing court should only interfere when manifest 
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error is shown. In State v. Renzo, 21 Utah 2d 205, 443 
P. 2d 392 (1968), this Court held as follows: 
". . . I t is a matter of discretion with the 
trial judge to determine whether the probative 
value of the picture outweighs the possible ad-
verse effect which might be produced upon be-
ing shown to a jury. (Citation omitted.) This 
discretion on the part of a trial judge to admit 
or reject evidence should not be interferred 
with by an appellate court unless manifest 
error is shown." 443 P . 2d at 399. 
The state was duty-bound to prove the identity of 
the assailant and all elements of the crime by whatever 
evidence was available. This includes photographs. The 
victim identified the appellant as the individual who com-
mitted the robbery from a selection of ten photographs 
(R. 119-120). The appellant admitted that the photo-
graph was a reasonable facsimile of the way he looked 
on the night that he was arrested and that there was 
nothing misleading about the picture (R. 167). 
The question as to the propriety of admitting such 
photographic evidence is largely within the discretion 
of the trial court. See State v. Johnson, 25 Utah 2d 46, 
475 P. 2d 543 (1970). The admission of the photograph 
of the appellant and the fact that the victim was able 
to identify the appellant as the individual who committed 
the robbery, gave probative value to the other testimony 
and evidence presented at trial. No inflammatory or 
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gruesome nature attended the photograph as confirmed 
by the appellant's own admission (R. 167). 
Respondent submits that inasmuch as it does not 
appear that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling 
upon the admissibility of the photograph that the ruling 
should not be disturbed. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY SUSTAINING 
THE STATE'S OBJECTION BASED UPON 
AN EXPRESSION OF LEGAL OPINION. 
Appellant contends that the Honorable Joseph G. 
Jeppson prejudiced the jury by sustaining the State's 
objection to closin gremarks made by counsel for the 
appellant. 
Utah case law on this point is well established. State 
v. Jameson, 103 Utah 129, 134 P. 2d 173 (1943), holds 
as follows: 
" . . . Both the court and prosecutors should 
be zealous in protecting the rights of an ac-
cused, and should carefully refrain from doing 
or saying anything which it might be inferred 
that an unfair advantage was taken of a de-
fendant." 134 P. 2d at 176. 
The trial court record indicates that Judge Jeppson 
seriously adhered to the aforementioned rule (R. 33). 
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At no time did he comment on the weakness or strength 
of appellant's evidence. 
In Utah, trial judges are not moderators or referees, 
however they can express themselves on all questions 
of law that arise in trial regardless of whether or not 
there is an objection. A judge may assign his reason floor 
the ruling and where such reasoning is based on an ex-
pression of a legal opinion or proposition of law, no re-
reversible error is committed. See State v. Kallas, 97 
Utah 492, 94 P. 2d 414 (1939). 
The remarks of Judge Jeppson, that appellant has 
called into question, were the result of a ruling that he 
made pursuant to the State's objection. The Court sus-
tained the objection and said that appellant's statement 
was unwarranted under the circumstances (R. 33). The 
statement of the trial court was an accurate statement 
of the law. (Respondent's Brief, page .....) Further, the 
judge's remarks were not addressed to the jury. The 
remark had nothing to do with the character of the de-
fendant or the strength of his case as far as the trial 
judge was concerned. Thus, it is clear that the ruling 
byJudge Jepson was not a comment upon the weight of 
the evidence. 
This Court in State v. Kallas, supra, defines the 
parameter of a trial court judge as follows : 
" . . . In Utah trial judges are not mod-
erators or referees and may express themselves 
on all questions of law in trial whether arising 
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upon exception or otherwise. And they . . . 
may within reasonable limitations assign their 
reasons for their rulings; and where their reas-
oning is based upon an expression of legal 
opinion, or a proposition of law no reversible 
error is committed." 94 P. 2d at 426. 
The case before this Court is unlike State v. Rosen-
baum, 22 Utah 2d 159, 449 P. 2d 999 (1969), in that at 
no time did Judge Jeppson direct his remarks to the 
jury. It was bench's judicial duty to rule on the objec-
tion and articulate the basis of its legal opinion. On the 
other hand, the trial judge in Rosenbaum wrongfully gave 
specific cautionary instructions directly to the jury re-
garding the defense of alibi. 
From the foregoing facts it is evidence that Judge 
Jeppson was merely performing his judicial functions 
as they related to the resolution of an objection. His 
statements to counsel were correct and supported the 
trial count record. At no time did he make prejudicial 
oammenst to the jury regarding weight to be given to 
appellant's evidence. Therefore, appellant's argument is 
simply without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
The physical evidence introduced by the State was 
the product of a lawful stop, arrest, and search which 
fully protected appellant's oonstitutional rights. There-
fore, the trial court was correct in admitting the evidence 
obtained. 
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Appellant was not prejudiced by the admission of 
his own photograph nor the court's statement during his 
closing argument. Such actions are clearly within the 
trial court's discretion. 
Therefore, respondent asks that the judgment of the 
Third District Court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
